In this issue of Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Yim, Choi, and Van Rooyen provide us with a unique glimpse into the sensitivities and complexities surrounding the delivery of humanitarian aid in North Korea and the compelling struggle that the humanitarian community must face to find the elusive humanitarian space. The lessons learned from this study are powerful testimony to the will of humanitarianism and the willingness of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to patiently challenge what doubters saw only as Orwellian theater that had no good ending.
The concept of "espace humanitaire" or "humanitarian space" ensures that the humanitarian community's actions for civilians exposed to extreme distress and caught up in war and conflict remain unencumbered and "free to evaluate needs, free to monitor the distribution and use of relief goods, and have a dialogue with the people who receive it." It is a synonym term for a physical, geographical space that is protected from fighting and maintained as a "conducive humanitarian operating environment." 2 Part and parcel of the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross, United Nations Children's Fund, and NGOs, is that their access and actions to protect civilians are uniquely protected under international law and covenants. Admittedly, the stated right of the humanitarian community to bypass governments, go directly to the beneficiaries in need, and operate free from unwarranted governmental interference or intrusion becomes an ideal that is more often than not challenged by nation-state authorities.
Many see humanitarian space as a valid issue only in context of war and conflict, the examples of which are many. 2, 3 Normally, NGOs work in failed states where the central authority has collapsed. Even in Afghanistan where aggressive violence takes place, donors and aid agencies that span the continuum between relief and every aspect of development, have insisted on their own assessments, monitoring, ongoing evaluation, and direct implementation of projects. Delivery of aid, in general, is a hazardous business and risks to relief workers during this decade have grown exponentially. Unconventional or asymmetrical warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan are just two examples where perpetrators, motivated by control of a population, leave everyone as a vulnerable target, resulting in a shrinking or absent humanitarian space. In Darfur alone, attacks against humanitarian workers increased by 150% in 2007. 4 Bass, in describing the political and cultural landscape of humanitarianism, declares that "to understand the patterns of humanitarian intervention, the vital first step is knowing where the reporters are." 5 For good reason, such events easily dominate the news and dictate our collective perception of modern day humanitarianism.
However, humanitarian space also can be threatened in prolonged nonconflict situations in which "no access, no information, no presence of inter-Editorial Comments say, was "in effect being thrust into the position of suitors asking the regime for the privilege of helping the North Korean people." The DPRK and its ministries were more interested in "materials, not advice" and prided themselves on being as strong as ever, requiring NGOs to work with, around, and through Pyongyang. 13, 14 From the outset, little information or data were available about the country and any request was seen as "unnecessarily intrusive". 7 Initially, isolating the ordinary North Korean was done through forbidding Korean speakers, and local contacts were continually replaced in order to frustrate attempts to build personal relationships. North Koreans "often shielded aid workers from the worst of their people's suffering, but at the same time, exposed sufficient suffering to less hard hit areas to engender sympathy." 13 With rare exceptions, NGOs were not allowed to establish local offices and visas were usually given only for short stays. 13 Religiously based NGOs, who routinely combine relief and religious instruction in other country missions, "were required to leave their religion at home." 15 The UN Agencies and NGOs involved in the initial emergency response were so isolated from the rest of the populace that they hardly had an opportunity to learn about how North Korea actually worked. They could not speak the language, had no intimate economic or geographical knowledge of the country, and were taken on very closely supervised field trips where the citizens were told ahead of time when to expect them. Most aid workers were confused by what they saw. 7, 13 While giving foreigners the benefit of the doubt, the perceived DPRK perspective, was that "NGO intents were either to destroy the regime or to gather intelligence." 13 The normal NGO standard operating procedures of transparency and accountability were out of the question; and, NGO concerns always focused on the restrictions to direct access to the beneficiaries of vulnerable groups and whether aid was reaching them. 7, 13 The NGOs most critical of the DPRK behaviors were likely to cease operations in the country, and others learned that having a dual interest in refugees fleeing the country, human rights, or issues of denuclearization precluded ever working within the country. However, progress slowly emerged from the spoils of these barriers. The DPRK allowed the United Nations to establish a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) residence office in 1980, was followed during the famine in 1995 by the WFP, the UNICEF in 1996, and in 1997 by the WHO and International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) as the first NGOs along with six other NGOs. Five of the original six NGOs left, with three voicing concerns that they were not reaching the most vulnerable children and that constraints prevented them from completing adequate assessments, monitoring, and evaluations. High profile NGOs like Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières, and CARE, all of whom were not allowed residence in the DPRK, for similar reasons have come and gone. The number, geographic, and resident status of NGOs in North Korea is determined over political lines. South Korean, Canadian, and Japanese NGOs are not residential, as are American except for small numbers of health and food monitors. European NGOs "deemed to be less dangerous, have enjoyed more freedom in comparison to South Korea and national organizations means no protection, no assistance, and no witnesses." 3 In such circumstances, NGOs have only limited possibilities to increase their action space and rarely are given the opportunity to assess or evaluate the impact of their aid.
Few readers are as aware of the unique, captivating, and complex test of will that first faced the humanitarian community in the DPRK, that along with Myanmar, represent the world's most inaccessible and closed nations. 6, 7 The contradiction is that North Korea is comparatively safe and secure for foreigners, yet it remains an intriguing and restrictive mystery to the outside world. 7 All NGOs confront serious political and administrative restrictions and constraints. Compared to the daily reports from conflict countries receiving aid, the DPRK, despite it being the world's largest recipient of food aid (followed by Ethiopia and Sudan), 8 allows no journalists or reporters, so few missives ever surface on the severe plight of human rights, starvation, and the declining health of its populace. 7, 9 Without access, the crucial unknown becomes the true impact of humanitarian aid; who provides it in this complex sociopolitical environment, how do they accomplish it, and does it reach those most deserving? It is, for the most part, a poorly understood interventional process that is considered an alien outlier in the humanitarian community, of which few humanitarian aid groups initially found successful, and others strongly denounced.
Despite its nuclear "technological successes", the DPRK is a country with few sustainable resources. The history that brought the sovereign DPRK to accept outside aid was unexpected in the outside world. Eighty percent of North Korea's land is covered by rocky, mountainous terrain. After many years of deforestation and the cultivation of steep lands, the soil was no longer arable, and lost its ability to hold water leading to floods when it rains and droughts when it does not. 10 The situation left the country with a chronic food shortage in 1995. Because of severe drought, typhoons, and flooding, food production declined to a state of famine. 11, 12 The world only learned about the famine through the huge numbers of refugees who fled to nearby Russia and China. The DPRK was embarrassed by being forced to ask for aid and reluctantly appealed to the international community for assistance to cope with food shortages that threatened further starvation. 7 The famine which continued into the next decade has resulted in wide unsubstantiated estimates of deaths, from a low of 220,000 to as high as three million (or >10% of the population). One estimate is that the famine and its consequences internally displaced 30% of North Korea's workforce, military, and government officials. 11 Prior to the 1990s, North Korea had no experience working with NGOs except for periodic links with the Red Cross and small delegations from American Friends Service Committee. 7, 13 The primary objective of the DPRK in dealing with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Food Program (WFP), and a small number of partner NGOs who responded to these appeals, was to "minimize contact and channels of communication with ordinary people and control access to the broader North Korean public, while drawing in as many resources as possible." The humanitarian community, some and human rights now are being allowed access to North Korea. The Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement and the related Korean American Sharing Movement, who both report frequently to Human Rights Watch, are two significant examples. Peace willing, these exposures will make a difference. Tragically, the recent and growing rumblings of war with South Korea would set every aid program, no matter how "imperfect", back to zero.
Classically, it is common for governments to applaud NGOs when they provide humanitarian services, but then to condemn them or restrict them when they advocate for improved policies. Some governments use regulatory constraints on NGOs in order to achieve political ends. 17, 18 Indeed, what has been shown to be true during the years in many other countries, is that establishing a good rapport with government may end-up compromising the NGO's accountability to the people. 19, 20 Clearly, no aid interventions compare to the complexities found in the DPRK, but North Korea is not the only country or regime that has shown fear of the influence of NGOs. Post-9/11, US counter-terrorism policies placed severe restrictions on the funds of NGOs with Islamic links. 21 In 2006, President Ahmadinejad of Iran moved to suppress the liberal trends of NGOs, journalists, women's groups, and other activists; and further, claimed that "counterfeit" NGOs were being formed to "support the government's official viewpoint rather than society's interests." 22 Post-Cold War Russia has more than 277,000 NGOs, but the Russian President Putin began a worrying trend over NGO operations when he signed a bill aimed at regulating the work of NGOs, especially those that were focused on an independent media and freedom of the press, and imposed bureaucratic impediments that led to closing of some foreign NGOs. 17, 23 During 2007 the Zambian government introduced a bill that would give government authority over the NGO sector. 24 And, in June 2008, Zimbabwe banned NGOs from working within the country, accusing the groups of siding with the opposition party. Many NGOs countered this move by accusing President Mugabe's regime that this act would ensure that no witnesses to its campaign of intimidation would remain and that these measures would deprive two million persons of food and other forms of basic assistance. 25 Three months later, the NGOs involved in humanitarian food aid, family and child protection, and the care of elderly and disabled persons were permitted to resume their work, but under strict surveillance. Those NGOs concerned with human rights, justice, and governance were banned. 26 Sovereignty and the inviolable borders of a nation-state, protected under Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, is but one shield used to keep reality from the rest of the world. Culture also plays a dominate role in a nation-state's interpretation and claim of sovereign rights. Whereas humanitarianism is strongly planted in many cultures, North Korea's deeply embedded cultural ideology of "juche"…that of self-reliance and self-sufficiency, may inadvertently clash if not culturally appreciated by NGOs and others. 27 Homegrown skepticism occurs, in part, because the concept of a non-governmental organization is non-existent in North Korea. 13 Globalization in the 20 th the United States" and were given the privilege of having a permanent residential working place in North Korea, a condition of aid funding; but also because they were more inclined to address humanitarian needs, arguing that humanitarian work should be separated from political or stability concerns. 7 Unfortunately, even today, the DPRK cannot feed its population by its own production and does not have the resources to purchase food from abroad. The most recent WFP and UNICEF reports indicate that 16-18% of children still suffer from chronic malnutrition with >25% suffering acute malnutrition. 10 In August 2007, the DPRK again experienced catastrophic flooding resulting in severe damage to homes and infrastructure, making some villages inaccessible, with 102,400 left homeless. 16 The IFRC and UNICEF provided non-food, emergency relief items, waterborne disease prevention, hygiene promotion, education and training of local Red Cross workers in communicable disease prevention and the restoration of primary health care for over 3.7 million people in 22 affected provinces. This was the largest IFRC appeal operation in the DPRK since the mid-1990s and evidenced unprecedented coordination with foreign NGOs. 16 In contrast to the mindset of a decade ago, one that steered US policy makers and others to a "worst-case" approach for the DPRK and its future, subtle but profound changes are evident in North Korea that give credence to something more positive. In fact, half of the original NGOs present in the mid-1990s, remain today and five more arrived between then and 2002. Significant bilateral concessions, negotiations, and coordination are taking place, some NGOs are openly staffing Korean speakers, have seen disaster skill sets advance in the North Koreans and preparedness and preparations have become more evident in their recent planning and responses. 7, 15 Information, although scant by Western standards, has shown that the aid has saved lives among those who "know no politics". The Northern region of North Korea, along the border with China, is thought to have been the hardest hit by famine. Though humanitarian agencies working directly through Pyongyang do not readily have the right of entry to these areas, 15 there are a number of foreign agencies at the border stationed in China that are being allowed access to the populations living in the regions hardest hit. It remains unclear whether these excursions are endorsed by the central government, but it is clear that the North Koreans have allowed fluidity to a certain extent that allows humanitarian action efforts to cross the border. The international community has preserved lines of communication and coordination, and slowly, local initiatives are evident that have the potential, with time, to yield to more self-reliance and prevent the development of a culture of dependence. Though the North Koreans still are wary of Korean speakers who are members of humanitarian teams, there are public sector initiatives outside of the humanitarian realm that have sought increased connection and exposure, such as the trip of the New York Philharmonic to Pyonyang in 2008 and the DPRK-sponsored exposure and exchange programs designed to help connect North Koreans with Korean diaspora. Agencies interested in refugee protection Editorial Comments something creative could be done to ensure this…then the prolonged wait is worth it.
The Yim, Choi, and Van Rooyen qualitative analysis study is revealing in many ways. The NGOs in their study are seasoned United States NGOs all with North Korean experience from the 1990s and most are religiously based. The latter affiliations suggest institutional traits and awareness that anticipate that endurance needs to be widely practiced. The NGOs smartly and incrementally devised innovative measures strategically designed to work within the parameters set up by the DPRK. Yet, both sides made subtle concessions that show willingness to keep their programmatic partnerships intact. There are many 'ambassadorial' dialogue lessons to learn from this study in pushing the envelope in both diplomacy and trust and the manner in which NGOs handled themselves. Most likely some initial information and assumptions about the ground truth in North Korea were misread. There is much we still don't know, but clearly, there is reason to challenge the forecasted fait a compli that humanitarian work in North Korea is nothing but a "lose-lose situation." 1 This publication is a pleasure to read. One finds that the opportunity to reflect on what one wasn't aware of or even remotely considered possible is an added bonus. Pardon the pun, but this study reveals that in the realm of humanitarianism, there remains much unconsidered "food" for thought.
Century, helped immensely by the Internet's vast communications network, gave rise to the importance of NGOs and the realization that many countries not blessed with equal capacity for resources and governance, cannot be expected to solve their problems within the nation alone. 28, 29 In recent years, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan argued that the international community has the "right to protect", a concept currently promoted by those who seek UN Charter reform, and claiming, especially in the case of genocide and ethnic cleansing, that all nations have the collective "responsibility to protect" their populace. 30, 31 This concept was a major arguing point for a forced international humanitarian intervention in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. Such petitions speak volumes to an increasing global view on interventionactions which certainly will impact the DPRK regime's future thinking, as well as that of the NGO community. [32] [33] [34] Difficult but uncomfortable decisions always must be made by NGOs. When to stay, when to leave, when and how to denounce, or whether the presence of the aid organization actually harms more than helps will continue as long as NGOs exist. But equally challenging is to know if all of the options have been exhausted. If in some manner aid can get through where there is some semblance of an understanding of humanity and the right to life or that
